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In the business world, more often than not companies pay for assets acquired or expenses 
incurred by giving up their right to something, such as an asset, or rendering services to the 
other party. Another way to pay for the acquisition of assets or expenses that is becoming 
popular in the business world today is by offering a stake of the company in the form of an 
issuance of shares in the company to the other party as payment. This situation, however, is 
not a clear-cut situation when it comes to calculating taxable income despite the fact that 
section 40CA of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962
1
 (hereinafter referred to as the „Act‟) deals 
with one of these situations. Section 40CA (1) (a) as amended says the following: 
    “(1) Subject to section 24B, if a company acquires any asset as defined in paragraph 1 of 
the Eight Schedule, from any person in exchange for- 
(a) Shares issued by that company, that company must be deemed to have actually 
incurred an amount of expenditure in respect of the acquisition of that asst which is 
equal to the market value of the shares immediately after the acquisition” 
      Section 40CA (1)(a) deals with the acquisition of an asset with the issuance of shares as 
payments. This provision of the Act only deals with such a situation, it does not deal with 
situations where services are rendered in exchange for shares issued and it also does not deal 
with other complex situations where a deeper understanding of this provision might be 
required. 
       However, even though this provision of the Act states that a company is deemed to have 
„actually incurred‟ an amount of „expenditure‟ in respect of acquiring an asset with a share 
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based payment, the recent passed judgment of CSARS v Labat Africa Limited
2
 makes the 
situation a bit more complicated. A taxpayer can use the general deductions formula or other 
specific deductions provisions in the Act to deduct this „deemed expenditure‟ under relevant 
deduction provisions of the Act. The general deductions formula is basically section 11(a) 
read with section 23(g) as laid out in the Act. Section 11(a) of the Act says: 
“General deductions allowed in determination of taxable income. For the purpose of 
determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade, 
there shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so derived-
expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of the income, provided such 
expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature” 
Read with section 23(g) which limits the deduction of such „expenditure actually incurred‟ to 
the extent that it is incurred for trade purposes. Section 23(g) reads: 
“(23) No deduction shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, namely – 
(g) Any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to 
which moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade” 
      In the past, there have been many cases dealing with the „actually incurred‟ part of the 
gross deductions definition. Therefore, that part is properly understood to mean a taxpayer 
actually incurs an expense or loss when there is an unconditional legal obligation. The Labat 
case was a section 11(gA) case but the phrase „expenditure actually incurred‟ is found in both 
section 11(gA) and section 11(a). Because a lot of deductions are deducted under section 
11(a) - or as it is known, the general deductions formula - the research will be focused on 
section 11(a), mainly on the phrase „expenditure actually incurred‟. Payments for services 
rendered, in most cases, meet the requirements of section 11(a) as well. It shall be assumed, 
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for the purposes of this research, that all the other requirements of the general deductions 
formula are met by share based payments incurred for services rendered. The other 
requirements being: the taxpayer carries on a trade, the expense was incurred in the 
production of income and the expense is of a revenue nature. 
     The meaning of „expenditure actually incurred‟ is correctly interpreted in Nasionale Pers 
Bpk v KBI (Nasionale Pers)
3
, Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR (Edgars Stores)
4
, CIR v Golden 
Dumps (Pty) Ltd (Golden Dumps)
5
 and a more recent case which is Ackermans Limited v 
CSARS (Ackermans)
6
. Some of these judgments were also used by the Income Tax Special 
Court in the ruling of ITC 1801
7
.  
     In the Nasionale Pers Bpk case, the taxpayer attempted to deduct expenditure when it was 
paid but there were still conditions to be met by the end of the year of assessment, if those 
conditions were not met by the parties that received the money, such moneys were to be 
refunded to the taxpayer. The obiter dictum of the case was that the legal liability arose 
outside the said year of assessment even though the payment of such expenditure had 
occurred in that year of assessment. Therefore, from this case, it was learned that a taxpayer 
should have an unconditional legal liability without any conditions present by the end of the 
year of assessment for that item to qualify as „expenditure actually incurred‟ under section 
11(a). The Edgars Stores case also had a condition to be met. The turnover rent (additional 
rent that was included in the lease agreement) was dependant on the amount of turnover at the 
end of its financial year which did not coincide with the end of the year of assessment. The 
judgment passed by Corbett JA was similar to the judgment that was passed in the Nasionale 
Pers Bpk case. The turnover rent could only be determined at the financial year end. 
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Therefore, if the turnover rent was higher that the basic rent, Edgars Stores would be 
unconditionally obliged to pay the difference only at the financial year end which fell outside 
the year of assessment in question. The same concept was discussed in the Golden Dumps 
case and McCreath J came to the same conclusion. 
   However, in all these mentioned cases, the term „expenditure‟ was never defined and the 
word is not defined in the Act and yet it is a very critical term in determining deductibility. If 
a taxpayer does not incur any „expenditure‟, the deduction will not be permissible. The Labat 
case is the only case that deals with the meaning of „expenditure‟. This research will analyse 
this judgment passed by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in order to determine the 
meaning of „expenditure‟ when applied to share – based payments as was the case in Labat. 
This will assist in answering the research question of this paper: was the SCA correct in its 
decision in Labat? 
    This objective will be reached by analysing the judgment of the Labat case and by looking 
at the relevant provisions of the Act. A comparison with other similar cases will also be done 













Description of the case 
Facts- CSARS v Labat Africa Limited 
Labat Africa Limited, under its former name of Acrem Holdings Limited, acquired the entire 
business operations of Labat-Anderson (South Africa) (Pty)Ltd under a business combination 
with a written agreement dated 15 February 1999.Labat-Anderson‟s business operations were 
defined to include all its tangible and intangible assets. The intangible assets included the 
trademark in particular. Labat Africa acquired the business for a consideration of 
R120million, which was to be paid by the issue of 133333333 Acrem shares to Labat-
Anderson at an issue price of 90cents per share. This purchase price, according to the 
agreement, was to be apportioned according to the values of the net tangible assets as they 
were reflected in the accounts. An independent and suitably qualified valuator was to 
evaluate the trademark and the value was to be determined by that valuator. The balance of 
the consideration was to be apportioned to Goodwill. 
     The taxpayer issued the shares and transferred them in terms of the agreement. The 
trademark, which was valued by the valuator, was valued at R44462000 and the allowance 
claimed under section 11(gA) was based on this valuation. Section 11(gA), as it read during 
the 2000 year of assessment when the allowance was claimed, provided for: 
“An allowance in respect of any expenditure (other than expenditure which has 
qualified in whole or part for deduction or allowance under any of the other provisions 
of this section or the corresponding provisions of any previous Income Tax Act) 












(iii) In acquiring by assignment from any other person any such patent, design, 
trademark or copyright or in acquiring any other property of a similar nature or any 
knowledge connected to the use of such patent, design, trade mark, copyright or such 
property or the right to have such knowledge imparted, if such invention, patent, 
design, trade mark, copyright, other property or knowledge, as the case may be, is used 
by the taxpayer in the production of income: Provided that – 
(aa) where such expenditure exceeds R3 000, and was incurred – 
(A) Before 29 October 1999, the allowance shall not exceed for any one year such portion 
of the amount of the expenditure as is equal to such amount divided by the number of 
years, which in the opinion of the Commissioner, represents the probable duration of 
use of the invention, patent, design, trade mark, copyright, other property or 
knowledge, or four per cent of the said amount, whichever is the greater.” 
 
     The Commissioner for South African Revenue Services (SARS) disallowed this deduction 
on the grounds that there had been no „expenditure actually incurred‟ when the taxpayer 
issued its shares as payment for the trademark, but the taxpayer argued otherwise. Therefore, 
the dispute lay in the definition of „expenditure actually incurred‟. 
Judgment 
The taxpayer appealed to the Income Tax Special Court under ITC 1801 in which the Tax 
Court upheld the taxpayer‟s appeal. The following reasons were given by the Income Tax 
Special Court for coming to its conclusion: 
     Firstly, the expression „expenditure actually incurred‟ meant that the taxpayer must have 
incurred an unconditional legal obligation in respect of the amount concerned. It is not 












expenditure becomes deductible. This decision relied on Edgars Stores Ltd v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue (Edgars Stores). In Edgars Stores, Corbett JA held that it was clear from 
the Nasionale Pers case that only expenditure (otherwise qualifying for deduction) in respect 
for which the taxpayer has incurred an unconditional legal obligation during the year of 
assessment in question may be deducted in terms of section 11(a) from income returned for 
that year. 
     Secondly, the Tax Court also referred to some English judgments that dealt with the effect 
of a transaction in terms of which a company acquires an asset in consideration of the 
issuance of fully paid shares. The first judgment relied on was Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd 
(Osborne
8
),the court, in this case, decided that the issue of shares f r the acquisition of assets 
amounted to “consideration” given by the company. The court also decided on what principle 
the value of the acquired assets had to be ascertained at, but this was not part of the issue at 
hand. The other cases were Craddock v Zevo Financing Co ltd (Craddock)
 9
 and Stanton 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Drayton Commercial Investment Co Ltd (Stanton)
10
. In the Craddock 
case, the court proposed that a company can issue its own shares „as consideration for 
acquisition of property‟ and secondly, that the value of consideration given in the form of 
fully paid shares allotted by a company is not the value of the shares of the shares allotted but 
is, in the case of an honest and straight forward transaction, the price on which the parties 
involved in the transaction agreed on. The High Court dismissed the Commissioner‟s appeal 
because it was in agreement with the ITC‟s decision. 
      However, SCA was not satisfied with the ITC‟s decision on the grounds that the decision 
did not deal with the meaning of expenditure and yet that was the reason why the taxpayer 
and the Commissioner were in dispute. Harms AP, in paragraph 8, said,  
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“the terms „obligation‟ or „liability‟ and „expenditure‟ are not synonymous as it is 
apparent from the judgment of Caltex Oil (SA) Limited v Secretary for Inland 
Revenue by Botha JA in the statement: „any expenditure actually incurred‟ means „all 
expenditure for which a liability has been incurred during the year, whether the 
liability has been discharged during the year or not
11
.” 
            Harms AP then went on to say that the liability or obligation must be discharged by 
means of expenditure and timing was not the question. In paragraph 12, the full court held 
that the term „expenditure‟ as defined in the English dictionary meant an amount of money 
spent and in the context of the Act, expenditure would also include disbursement of other 
assets with a monetary value. The court suggested that the taxpayer had to be poorer at the 
end of the day because the value of the counter-performance might add more value or might 
be the same value as the amount expensed. This has been described as the “impoverishment 
test”. Harms AP took the liberty of using Goldbatt J‟s judgment in ITC 1783 (66)
12
 which 
said an allotment or issue of shares does not in any way reduce the assets of the company 
although it might reduce the value of the shares held by shareholders, therefore it cannot 
qualify as an expenditure. The full court also decided that the fact the parties had constructed 
their agreement differently and tax efficiently was beside the point. 
The Commissioner‟s appeal was upheld with costs.  
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Firstly, I will to look at the meaning of expenditure in „expenditure actually incurred‟ with 
respect to the judgment passed on by the SCA. The problem with share based payments lies 
in the definition of expenditure because this determines whether share based payments for 
services rendered will qualify as „expenditure‟ as defined by the SCA. But before I do that, I 
would like to first discuss what shares are.  
     Jansen Van Rensburg does not analyse the Labat case per se but his journal article is about 
the meaning of expenditure regarding share based payments which is directly linked to the 




      Jansen van Rensburg discusses the legal nature of shares before he considers whether the 
shares should be considered as expenditure, which, in my view, is a good approach because it 
helps understand exactly what share based payments are since that is where the bulk of the 
misunderstanding lies. Jansen Van Rensberg describes shares as a complex of personal rights 
which are granted to a subscriber but he says that these rights do not include a right of 
ownership in the assets of the company and the issuing of these shares does not constitute the 
transfer of a company‟s property.
14
 From my own understanding, it is usually a right to 
ownership of the company which results in a right in the distribution of the company‟s profits 
depending on the financial performance and financial position of the company and the class 
of shares that the shareholder holds, such ownership does not entail that a shareholder owns 
the underlying assets and liabilities of a company unless the shareholder owns enough voting 
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rights to control the company. Therefore when a company issues shares as payment for 
services rendered or acquiring assets, it is only giving away a right to a distribution in profits 
thus none of the company‟s assets is given or diminished by such a transaction. 
      Jansen van Rensburg makes a reference to Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue
15
 to show that it may be difficult to distinguish between instances where a 
company has agreed to pay a monetary amount and those where it has agreed to issue shares, 
in return for the transfer of assets.
16
 Usually when a company issues shares, it gets money 
from that share issue, however in situations where a company issues shares in return for the 
transfer of assets or as payment for services rendered, it uses the money received from the 
allotment from the transferee of the asset as payment for the asset or for the services so 
received, therefore the situation results in a set-off because money received by the issuer 
from the transferee goes back to the transferee as payment for asset or services rendered. The 
confusion that Jansen van Rensburg refers to is the confusion that is caused when a company 
decides to eliminate the mid process of receiving money for shares received and paying for 
the asset from the same person that the shares are issued to, and when a company is actually 
required to pay an amount in cash for the asset acquired. 
       In Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, the tax court had to 
decide what amount was to be included for the disposal of certain mineral rights if they were 
considered as not of a capital nature. The agreement between Lace Proprietary Mines and the 
purchaser for the sale of the mineral rights stated the following: “250000 to be paid and 
satisfied by the allotment and issue to the seller of 1000000 shares of 5s each in the capital of 
the purchaser credited as fully paid”. The court held that the consideration was 1000000 
shares because no cash could be demanded by Lace Proprietary Mines and that the purchaser 
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was entitled to deliver those shares as consideration paid. Therefore Lace Mines Proprietary 
was meant to receive a consideration in kind, not in cash. The Labat case is much like that 
Lace Proprietary Mines case because the consideration was also to be satisfied by the issue 
of shares, the consideration of R120million was to be paid by an issue of 133333333 shares at 
an issue price of 90cents per share. The seller, according to the agreement, was to receive 
those shares instead of cash. Therefore, given the facts in the Labat case, it is safe to say that 
Labat did not agree to pay a monetary amount for the acquisition of the trade mark. This, 
however, does not give us the answer to the question whether the taxpayer „expended‟ any 
amount in terms of the definition in paragraph 8 and paragraph 12 of the Labat case. It only 
clears the confusion between the issue of shares as payment and actual payment. 
I will now consider the arguments raised in favour of and against the Labat decision before 
presenting my own view on the case 
3.1 Arguments in favour of the Labat decision 
3.1.1 ‘Expenditure’ and ‘actually incurred’ are not discrete requirements 
Chris Cilliers
17
 argues that the reasoning by Harms AP was not flawed. According to Cilliers, 
Harms AP did not really put the cart before the horse, as was mentioned in the editorial note 
to the Labat case in The Taxpayer, but the horse was simply ignored altogether thus Harms 
AP looked at the cart only. Cilliers suggests that the solution lies in bearing in mind that one 
should not interpret the word „expenditure‟ and the phrase „actually incurred‟ as discrete 
requirements that have nothing to do with each other. Rather, the phrase „expenditure actually 
incurred‟ should be interpreted as a whole, even though some particular cases can depend on 
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a particular requirement of the general deductions formula.
 18
 This is the situation in the 
Labat case; the problem and the solution are based around the meaning of „expenditure‟, 
rather than the „actually incurred‟ part. Cilliers also says that the criticism expressed in 
relation to paragraph 8 of the Labat case falls away once it is understood that the words 
„actually incurred‟ may also operate to lessen or diminish what would otherwise have been 
expected of a taxpayer seeking to argue that section 11(a) applies in a given situation. He 
further says that the role played by the word „expenditure‟ is merely to emphasise that an 
unconditional obligation on its own is not enough. The subject matter or object of the 
obligation must correspond to something that would constitute „expenditure‟ in the sense 
envisaged in paragraph 12 of Labat, in other words, it must involve the diminution or 
movement of the taxpayers‟ assets. He says that this question is capable of being answered 
before the relevant obligation is discharged. From my understanding of this analysis, Cilliers 
agrees with Harms AP that even though Labat had an unconditional obligation to issue shares 
as payment, one need in a certain sense not have „expenditure‟ before there can be said to be 
„expenditure actually incurred‟ – to the extent that „actually incurred‟ means that there need 
not yet be expenditure. 
      Cilliers categorises the different kinds of permutations and combinations that can be 
raised with regards to the general deduction requirements. In category A, if a taxpayer has no 
unconditional obligation or an object that would constitute „expenditure‟ in terms of 
paragraphs 8 and 12 of the Labat case, that taxpayer will not qualify for a section 11(a) 
deduction. In category B, if a taxpayer does not have an unconditional obligation but has 
„expenditure‟ in terms of paragraph 8 and 12 of the Labat case, that taxpayer will also not 
qualify for a section 11(a) deduction unless the obligation becomes unconditional. In 
category C, if a taxpayer has an unconditional obligation but does not have „expenditure‟ in 
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terms of paragraph 8 and 12 of the Labat case, that taxpayer will not qualify for a section 
11(a) deduction.  Category C is where the Labat case falls in to because Labat was 
unconditionally obliged to give away something that did not constitute expenditure according 
to Harms AP because there was no diminution of assets that was to be anticipated. Cilliers 
says that the question of whether such diminution of assets is anticipated can be answered 
before the obligation is discharged. 
3.2 ARGUMENTS CRITICISING THE LABAT DECISION 
3.2.1 CONTRADICTS ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT 
With regards to the decision passed by the SCA that the liability or obligation must be 
discharged by means of an expenditure, in SP van Zyl‟s
19
 opinion, the reasoning by the SCA 
confuses expenditure with the discharge of an obligation or actual payment of the obligation. 
It is important to point out that section 11(a) does not require that expenditure must be 
discharged for an „expenditure actually incurred‟ to qualify as a deduction and neither does 
section 11(gA). SP van Zyl further says that the SCA‟s judgment is in contradiction to the 
judgments in Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI (1986); Caltex Oil v SIR and the judgment by Corbett 
JA in Edgars Stores v SIR, where it was confirmed that an obligation need not be discharged 
for the „expenditure‟ to have been incurred. These were some of the cases that were used by 
the Income Tax Court in reaching its conclusion. These cases all came to the same conclusion 
that the phrase „expenditure actually incurred‟ meant that there had to be an unconditional 
liability which fell in that specific year of assessment and that the expenditure did not need to 
be discharged for such „expenditure‟ to be deductible under section 11(a) read with section 
23(g). Therefore it has been proven by case law that no discharge of expenditure is required 
for something to qualify as „expenditure actually incurred‟. In SP van Zyl‟s view, the court 
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confused the meaning of expenditure by interpreting it to mean actual payment whilst trying 
to distinguish „expenditure‟ and „actually incurred‟ which results in two meanings of the 
same phrase that can contradict each other instead of interpreting the phrase as a whole. The 
first meaning being - „actually incurred‟ means that an unconditional obligation must exist 
and that actual payment is not relevant for an expense to have been incurred, the other 
meaning being – „expenditure‟ means the actual discharge (payment) of an obligation. SP van 
Zyl calls this an untenable situation. 
       In an editorial note, the statement by Harms AP from paragraph 8 of the Labat case 
judgment which said the following; “In other words, the liability or obligation must be 
discharged by means of expenditure- timing is not the question” was criticised.  It was said 
that Harms AP made a mistake by saying that statement because expenditure must first exist 
before it can be „actually incurred‟.
20
 „Expenditure actually incurred‟ refers to the coming 
into existence of an absolute and unconditional liability, usually to pay or to perform a 
service but in the Labat case the absolute and unconditional liability was to give fully 
credited shares to the other party.Harms AP seemed to have „put the cart before the horse‟ 
because expenditure is not the thing that discharges a liability or obligation, but it gives rise 
to a liability or obligation. Payment for the expenditure, or rendering a service to the other 
party, is what discharges the liability or the obligation owing to the other party. Labat 
discharged it‟s liability by the payment of shares. 
       SP van Zyl lays down the following illustration in his article to illustrate the confusion 
caused by the SCA. This SCA judgment is not to be ignored as it deals with an important 
principle that everyone has ignored in the past years, which is to consider whether there was 
any „expenditure‟ before we consider the question whether it was actually incurred. The 
illustration is as follows: “where X incurred an unconditional liability in the 2009 year of 
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assessment but pays the liability in the 2010 year of assessment, the amount is not deductible 
in 2010, because it was not actually incurred, although expended. The amount will not be 
deductible in 2009, because it was not expended, although it was actually incurred.”.
21
 So 
when will this expenditure be accepted as a deduction if we consider both definitions? 
         Trevor Emslie
22
 answers this question in a straight forward way when he sets out what 
he feels to be the correct test for the word „expenditure‟. This test is based on the Caltex case 
judgment and is as follows:  
“ Firstly, the word „expenditure‟, contrary to what may appear to have been held by 
Harms AP, refers to a contractual (or other legal) obligation to spend money or to 
disburse other assets with a monetary value. Secondly, such expenditure is „actually 
incurred‟ in the year in which a taxpayer‟s liability in terms of such obligation 
becomes absolute and unconditional. Thirdly, such liability is discharged, not by the 
expenditure, but by the payment or disbursement of other assets with a monetary 
value which extinguishes that liability.”
23
 
            R de Swardt
24
 argues that in order for a share based payment made for services 
rendered to qualify as an „expense‟ that is „actually incurred‟, the taxpayer should incur an 
unconditional liability with regards to the expense, with reference to an argument by Burt
25
. 
Burt‟s argument is based on the Caltex Oil judgment, precisely the phrase „expenditure would 
also be actually if an unconditional legal obligation has been incurred in terms of which some 
performance is due, provided that the performance due has a monetary value. Burt argues that 
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“the incurral of the legal obligation as a fact cannot be affected by the means by which that 
obligation is discharged. There is nothing in the Caltex Oil judgment that suggests that 
expenditure will be regarded as having been incurred only if the discharge of the legal 
obligation results in the diminution of the assets of the person who incurred that legal 
obligation.”.
26
 In other words, Burt proposes that a taxpayer who has rendered a service with 
a monetary value has „actually incurred‟ an expense that is to be measured at the market 
value. 
       In the judgment, the SCA held that the term „expenditure‟ was not defined in the Act. It 
was an ordinary English word and, unless the context indicated otherwise, its ordinary 
meaning had to be attributed to it. The ordinary meaning of „expenditure‟ refers to the action 
of spending funds, disbursement or consumption, and hence the amount of money spent. In 
the context of the Act, „expenditure‟ would also include the disbursement of other assets with 
a monetary value. SP van Zyl points out that the SCA did not consider the meaning of the 
term „consideration‟. The Income Tax Court applied the United Kingdom judgment in 
Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd. In this judgment, the court ruled that the issue of shares by a 
company amounted to consideration paid. However, Harms AP ruled that this did not bear 
any relation to whether the issuing of shares equal expenditure. All the English cases that 
were used by the tax court were considered irrelevant in determining what expenditure meant 
by Harms AP. 
 
       Consideration is defined in the legal dictionary as “[s]omething of value given by both 
parties to a contract that induces them to enter into the agreement to exchange mutual 
performances”.
 27
 This definition is something that should have been considered by the SCA 
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because it encompasses more than what the definition of expenditure encompasses. The 
definition of expenditure relates to spending of cash only but the definition of consideration 
encompasses anything with a value on it. The shares issued by Labat as payment for the 
trademark had a value on the market, this was worth to put in to consideration, and yet the 
SCA said this did not bear any relation to the term expenditure.  SP van Zyl puts this point 
across in a different way in his article. He says, 
 “Where expenditure relates to the spending of funds or money, “consideration” has a 
wider application to include the exchange of anything for something else. Although 
sections 11(a) and 11(gA) do not specifically require that the expenditure must have 
been incurred in cash, I doubt that the legislator intended to limit the deduction or 




      The problem that was found in the Labat case was that there was no contractual 
obligation by the taxpayer company to spend its own money or disburse any of its assets with 
a monetary value, and hence there was no „expenditure‟. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, 
Harms AP says the following:
 29
  
“Labat-Anderson assigned the trade mark as consideration for the shares and the 
taxpayer did not „expend‟ any money or assets in acquiring the trade mark. As 
Goldblatt J said in ITC 1783 (66) SATC 373, an allotment or issuing of shares does 
not in any way reduce the assets of the company although it may reduce the value of 
the shares held by its shareholders, and that it can therefore not qualify as an 
expenditure.”. 
     This follows a point in paragraph 12 which says that for expenditure requires a diminution 
or a movement of the assets of the person who expends. The SCA used Goldblatt‟s judgment 
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from ITC 1783 which was not backed up with any authority; the judgment was based on a 
textbook passage from Silke on South African Income Tax
30
. This judgment did not make any 
reference to the Companies Act
31
, as mentioned by the late author David Meyerowitz
32
 in an 
issue of the Taxpayer. The Companies Act requires that there should be quid pro quo for the 
issue of shares; Judge Goldblatt clearly ignored this provision in his judgment as the asset 
received was the quid pro quo for the shares.
33
 However, this judgment was correct in 
defining the term „expenditure‟. In SP van Zyl‟s point, the court was correct in pointing out 
that some sort of diminution is required for expenditure to have been incurred. The 
conceptual framework of accounting even requires the same thing i.e in accounting terms; 
expenses are decreases in economic benefits during the accounting period in the form of 
outflows or depletions of assets.
 34
 Therefore the court was correct in this respect. However, 
the tax court did not apply the “impoverishment test” in its judgment. SP van Zyl points out 
that in applying the impoverishment test, a person should be very careful not to confuse 
„expenditure‟ with actual payment or partings with assets because a person does not really 
need to actually pay someone in cash someone for a service acquired or reduce their already 
existing asset base. 
 
       SP van Zyl gives the following example to express the point about the impoverishment 
test and its difference to actual payment or parting with assets in the following way: “X, a 
physiotherapist, in exchange for services rendered by Y (an electrician), performs 
physiotherapy on Y in full and final payment of the obligation.”.
35
 As we can see from this 
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illustration, X did not pay any money for services received from Y and he did not part with 
any assets that he already owns but what he lost is a right to receive a certain amount from 
another patient that he was going to charge for the same physiotherapy that he gave to X as 
payment for services rendered. SP van Zyl says if Harms AP‟s interpretation of „expenditure‟ 
is applied in this example, the expense was actually incurred when the electrician rendered 
the services and expended when the electrician accepted physiotherapy as datio in solutum 
debiti.
36
 Therefore, in this regard, the taxpayer is impoverished. The above example leads us 
to the second argument that is raised with regards to share based payments as „expenditure‟, 




3.2.2 THE RIGHTS FORGONE ARGUMENT 
This argument is the argument that: 
 “Even if it is accepted that „expenditure‟ requires a diminution in the taxpayer‟s 
assets, it can be said that when a taxpayer agrees to make a share based payment; it 
forgoes its right to claim cash. And, since the right so forgone constitutes a diminution 




            This is the argument that was used in one of the foreign cases that was used by the 
Income Tax Special Court in reaching its conclusion. The Income Tax Special Court used 
three cases from the United Kingdom which were based on share based payments for asset 
acquisition. However, these cases were criticized by Harms AP when he said he did not 
understand how they helped in defining expenditure. These cases are: Osborne v Steel Barrel 
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, Craddock v Zevo Finance Co Limited
40
 and Stanton (Inspector of Taxes) v 
Drayton Commercial Investments Co Limited
41
. The Osborne case is the case where the right 
forgone theory is explained, the other two cases deal with the measurement of this right 
forgone but measurement or valuation was never an issue in the Labat case. Therefore I shall 
only look at the Osborne case in more detail. 
 
      The Osborne case was a case about the acquisition of trading stock with a share based 
payment. In the Osborne case, the question that was raised was whether an amount could be 
included in the opening balance of the acquired trading stock, which is what brought Lord  




“It was strenuously argued on behalf of the crown that, if a company acquires stock 
in consideration of the issue of fully-paid shares to the vendor, that stock must, for the 
purpose of ascertaining the company‟s profits, be treated as having been acquired for 
nothing… The argument really rests on a misconception as to what happens when a 
company issues shares credited as fully paid for a consideration other than cash. The 
primary liability of an allottee of shares is to pay for them in cash; but, when shares 
are allotted credited as fully paid; this primary liability is satisfied by a consideration 
other than cash passing from the allottee. A company, therefore, when in pursuance of 
such a transaction, it agrees to credit the shares as fully paid, is giving up what it 
would otherwise have had – namely, the right to call on the allottee for payment of the 
par value in cash.” 
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If we apply the „impoverishment test‟ to the concept of the right forgone, the shares issued 
for payment will definitely qualify as expenditure according to Harms AP‟s requirements for 
„expenditure‟, but firstly we need to ascertain if this right is really an asset of the taxpayer. 
Following from the Lord Greene‟s judgment, in the statement, “. A company, therefore, when 
in pursuance of such a transaction, it agrees to credit the shares as fully paid, is giving up 
what it would otherwise have had – namely, the right to call on the allottee for payment of the 
par value in cash”, it is clear that the company that issues the shares becomes entitled to 
payment only when the public subscribes to the share issue, before that there is no right to 
such because there is no contractual rights that exist on shares. Therefore this right only arises 
when the shares are subscribed for; hence a company that credits shares as fully paid for does 
lose on its right to receive cash from that allotment. Rights are assets that an individual 
expects future economic benefits from therefore by forgoing that right, an individual loses on 
future economic benefits that were supposed to be received from the individual‟s ability to 
control that right. Because a right is lost, the individual‟s assets are therefore diminished. De 
Swardt also argues that the forfeiture of an expectation could perhaps be classified as a 
forfeiture of a spes but this kind of forfeiture is not recognised as an enforceable right for it is 
only the loss of hope of acquiring something.
 43
 De Swardt further argues that the “primary 
right” of a company to receive a cash subscription price could be regarded as a “personal 
right against the allottee that would have been enforceable had the subscription agreement not 
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       This argument takes the same approach that was used to come to the conclusion of 
CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd (2007) (Brummeria)
45
. The judgment to this case 
raised a lot of questions. The facts of this case are as follows: Brummeria Renaissance 
obtained interest free loans to finance the construction of units in retirement villages as a quid 
pro quo for granting the lenders life occupation rights to the units. Brummeria Renaissance 
had contended that an amount which has accrued to a taxpayer otherwise than in cash only 
falls within the definition of „gross income‟ if it capable of being turned into money. The 
Commissioner included the taxpayers‟ gross income amounts representing the value of the 
rights to use the loans interest free, against which the inclusion the taxpayer objected and 
appealed successfully to the Tax Court. The Commissioner was not happy with the Tax 
Court‟s decision therefore he appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Cloete JA held that 
the making of an interest free loan constituted a continuing donation to the borrower which 
conferred a benefit upon such borrower, and it could hardly be doubted that, in the modern 
commercial world, the right to retain and use loan capital for a period of time, interest free, 
was a valuable right. In this judgment, the taxpayer did not receive any cash or kind but the 
SCA held that he had a specific right to the interest free loans and that right could be valued. I 
do understand that the requirements for „gross income‟ and the requirements for something to 
qualify under the „general deductions formula‟ are different but in this respect, Brummeria 
had an amount added to its „gross income‟ which it was never going to receive. 
 
        Marias
46
 also argues that if the facts of Labat are tweaked and Labat first issued the 
shares before receiving the trademark, the resultant situation will be that the taxpayer will be 
left with a right to claim the asset which will be lost when the taxpayer receives the asset 
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 Therefore Labat would have met the requirements if the movement in the assets was 
the test to be applied. 
3.2.3 CREATES ANOMALIES 
It was stated in paragraph 17 of the Labat decision that anomalies would be created by such a 
judgment. However, there are far more anomalies that are less complicated than the ones that 
were mentioned in the judgment. 
        Harms AP submitted in the judgment that the words „obligation‟ and „expenditure‟ are 
not synonymous, however Marias argues that „obligation‟ will always rise from „expenditure‟ 
because an unconditional liability cannot be present without an expenditure having been 
incurred in the first place. 
 
      Although accounting and tax should not be mixed, applying accounting principles for the 
Labat decision cannot be entirely thrown out of the window. Marias applies the „accounting 
equation‟ to the obligation to issue shares.
 48
 The accounting equation is as follows: Assets = 
Liabilities + Equity. Harms AP admitted that there was an obligation at hand, therefore 
liabilities increased and an increase in liabilities should lead to an increase in assets (assets 
are considered as glorified expenses by accountants) or a decrease in equity, a decrease in 
equity which is caused by an increase in expense or loss. The journal entry that follows the 
transaction would be a credit to the share capital account and a debit to an asset or expense 
account. This principle should not be ignored because the principle follows that no obligation 
can arise without a corresponding expense. The SCA acknowledged the existence of an 
obligation in the Labat decision, therefore, using the above principles, the existence of 
„expenditure‟ was also acknowledged. 
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        The recently published Binding Private Ruling 124 deals with loan repayments by way 
of share issue
49
. It is confirmed that where a loan is repaid from the proceeds of a share issue 
carried out right before the loan repayment, the subscription price paid for the shares issued 
and used to repay the loan would be regarded as „expenditure‟. This is almost the same 
situation as the Labat case but the mid process is eliminated in the Labat situation. The 
question that arises from this Binding Private Ruling 124 is if a share issue to a creditor for 
the repayment of a loan will also qualify as expenditure? Marias says that it submitted that 
this would fly in the face of the „substance over form‟ doctrine. 
       Another anomaly that Labat raised was the issue of capital gains tax, but this anomaly 




3.3 MY VIEWPOINT 
I do agree with SP van Zyl‟s view about the confusion caused by the SCA with regards to the 
statement that „liability or obligation must be discharged by means of an “expenditure”‟. In 
my opinion an obligation or liability is discharged by payment and an unconditional 
obligation arises when expenditure is actually incurred, therefore I agree with the judgment in 
the Caltex case that was applied by the tax court. The pattern should be as follows: 
„Expenditure‟ must be incurred first, if a taxpayer does not pay for the expenditure 
instantaneously then the taxpayer has an unconditional obligation to pay for that expenditure 
in the future, this obligation should result in a future outflow of the resources of the company. 
The last phase is the payment that discharges the obligation from the taxpayer‟s hands. This 
makes sense because the term obligation, as defined in the English dictionary, means “the 
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state of being forced or compelled to do or pay something”. One can only be compelled or 
forced to pay something when they have already entered in a transaction that has such an 
effect, which is the expense. However the SCA got the pattern the other way round in the 
judgment of the Labat case. The SCA said that the obligation must be discharged by means 
of expenditure. Expenditure is a completely different thing from payment but the SCA made 
it seem like it was the same thing. With all due respect, Harms AP got it all wrong in that 
judgment. If we look at a different scenario whereby the taxpayer enters into a contract to pay 
for a service rendered to him by issuing out shares, but the taxpayer somehow breaches that 
contract and as a result of the breach the taxpayer is required to pay the full amount of the 
services rendered in the following tax year of assessment. How will this payment be treated if 
we use the Labat judgment because such expenditure will be disallowed in the year that it 
arose because the contract stated a share based payment? This is the reason why I think that 
how an obligation or liability is discharged should not matter as long as the taxpayer is 
compelled to perform. Therefore how an obligation is discharged should not matter, what 
matters is the incurrence of an expense which leads to an unconditional obligation. This is 
what determines whether that thing should be deducted under the general deductions formula 
or other specific deductions, in this case, a deduction allowable under section 11(gA). 
 
        I think Chris Cilliers raises a good point in his illustration of category C where an 
unconditional obligation can exist but the object or subject-matter of obligation does or 
would not constitute „expenditure‟ as contemplated in paragraphs (8) and (12) of Labat. 
However, if we take the share issue by Labat as payment and use the rights forgone 
argument, we can see that the shares issued result in an object or subject of obligation that 
constitutes „expenditure‟ as contemplated in paragraph (8) and (12). The right to receive cash 












the taxpayer have diminished. The definition of expenditure as contemplated in the Labat 
judgment requires that there should be the actual spending of money or the actual 
disbursement of an asset with a monetary value which results in a diminution or movement of 
the assets of the person who expends. I also do not agree with Cilliers because the actual 
meaning of expenditure is not, with all due respect, the meaning that was attributed to it in 
the Labat judgment. The meaning attributed to the term best defines payment even though the 
meaning is taken straight out of the dictionary. Emslie says expenditure is the contractual (or 
other legal) obligation to spend money or to disburse an asset with a monetary value which 
will result in a future diminution or movement of assets of the person who expends.
 50
 This 
meaning distinguishes expenditure from payment. Therefore Cilliers argument falls away 
because „expenditure‟ as contemplated in paragraph (8) and (12) is actual payment and also 
the requirements are of the aforementioned paragraphs are satisfied. 
 
        With regards to the right forgone argument, I strongly agree with the argument that a 
taxpayer loses a right to receive cash when he decides to make a share based payment. In my 
view, the same can be said when a taxpayer loses the right to get a payment for a service 
rendered, or in other words, the right to enrich oneself for example when a debtor goes bad; 
this should be considered as „expenditure actually incurred‟ because the taxpayer could have 
easily gained from that activity or transaction but instead the taxpayer gave that right up. If 
we consider the example of a debtor not being able to pay for their debts to the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer had a right to receive the money hence such amount was included in the assets of 
the business but when the debtor defaults on payment, the taxpayer loses the right and that 
right becomes an expense. If a taxpayer can have money that will never be received in their 
„gross income‟, giving up something that does not affect the financial performance or 
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financial position of the taxpayer, depending on the situation – in this case, paying for 
services rendered by issuing shares - should also have an effect because the taxpayer loses 
out an raising capital from that share issue. 
  
        The above example is similar to the recent authority where a taxpayer gave up their 
rights to receive payment but this was not allowed as a deduction in the Ackermans case. Van 
Rensburg says that there are similarities between arguments raised by the taxpayers in the 
Labat case and the Ackermans case which become apparent if one rewords the argument in 
the Ackermans case as follows: “the taxpayer had the „right‟ to sell its business assets for 
cash”.
51
 The similarity comes when we say that Ackermans gave up its right to receive the 
cash for its business assets when the purchaser assumed its liabilities in the agreement. The 
facts of Ackermans Limited v CSARS (2011)
52
 are as follows: The taxpayer sold a business to 
Pep Stores (SA) Limited as a going concern. The purchase price was defined as the amount 
equal to the sum of R800million and the rand amount of the liabilities which was an amount 
of R329 4440402. The liabilities included contingent liabilities which were conditional as at 
the effective date when Pepkor assumed them. The taxpayer sought to deduct the amount of 
the contingent liabilities in terms of section 11(a) on the basis that it was required to forgo a 
portion of the purchase price it would otherwise have been entitled to, this amounting to an 
„expenditure actually incurred‟ in the form of the contingent liabilities. Cloete JA held that 
the fact that the taxpayer had rid itself of liabilities by accepting a lesser purchase price than 
it would have received had it retained the liabilities did not mean, in fact or in law, that it had 
incurred expenditure to the extent that the purchase price was reduced by the liabilities. The 
SCA held that a taxpayer can incur „expenditure‟ only if it has incurred a „liability to pay‟.  
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          Firstly, contingent liabilities
53
 are possible obligations or present obligations which do 
not meet the recognition criteria for liabilities because their existence can only be confirmed 
at a later stage in the future or it is not certain that an outflow of cash will be required for 
settlement of such an obligation; therefore the business sold by Ackermans to Pep was not 
sold at Net present value because contingent liabilities do not affect the financial position of a 
company. The taxpayer, in support of its claim, argued that „expenditure‟ includes all „actual, 
quantifiable diminutions or prejudicial effects suffered by the taxpayer‟s patrimony‟. 
However, the taxpayer forgot that such expenditure had to meet certain requirements first. 
From the previous cases mentioned above, a liability gives rise to an unconditional 
obligation, that condition is not met by contingent liabilities (contingent liabilities are also not 
considered as liabilities in accounting, they are only disclosed in the notes for the purpose of 
fair representation to the users of such information). Hence the taxpayer included these 
contingent liabilities at its detriment because it had no present obligation. Secondly, the 
taxpayer did incur „expenditure‟ as defined in paragraph 12 by Harms AP because there was 
a diminution of the taxpayer‟s assets, however, this diminution was one which the taxpayer 
decided to do on its own, and there was no unconditional obligation for the diminution of the 
assets. Therefore, in my opinion, yes the taxpayer had a right to receive the amount that was 
given up for the contingent liabilities and he did meet the „expenditure‟ requirement in 
paragraph 12 but the taxpayer did not meet the „actually incurred‟ requirement of the „general 
deductions formula‟. If we use Cilliers‟ analysis to the Ackermans case, this situation is in 
Category B where there is no unconditional obligation but there is an object or subject matter 
of obligation which constitutes „expenditure‟ as contemplated in paragraph 12 of the Labat 
case. Thus we cannot compare this case to the Labat case because Labat had an unconditional 
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liability to issue those shares as payment. The right forgone principle only applies to 
situations where there an unconditional obligation was present.  
 
         These are the anomalies that the taxpayer submitted before the SCA in paragraph 17
54
. 
The taxpayer‟s counsel mentioned that it would be incongruous to regard the shares issued by 
the taxpayer company as being „consideration‟ in the hands of the „purchaser‟ for the same 
purpose of selling the trade mark. Harms AP responded to this by saying that “taxable income 
is not the difference between gross income and expenditure; and gross income is not limited 
to the converse of expenditures. In my view, this anomaly was not expressed in a way that it 
should have been properly expressed; the taxpayer should have referred to the inclusion of 
rights in the gross income as was done in the Brummeria case. I do agree with Harms AP 
when he says that gross income is not limited to the converse of expenditures but the rights 
argument that was used in the Brummeria case could have easily been used to prove a point 
by the taxpayer‟s counsel because as we saw earlier, Brummeria had to include a right that it 
had received in its gross income. What if it had lost that right due to some unforeseen 
circumstance? Would the loss of such a right have resulted in „expenditure actually 
incurred‟? My opinion is it would have been included because the test of the movement of 
assets for existence of expenditure would have been satisfied. 
 
           Marias points out that the South African Revenue Service Draft Interpretation Note 
which is dated 16 March 2004 on the issue about share based payments which takes the view 
that costs funded by a share issue are not „expenditure‟ as contemplated in the Act has never 
been finalised.
 55
 It is definitely interesting to note that it has never been finalised. One cannot 
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help but wonder why it has never been finalised. Maybe it is because it remains a 





As mentioned earlier, the Labat case is the first case to deal with the definition of 
expenditure, however, since this research is based on the deductibility of share based 
payments, there are other cases where the same issue was the problem. The cases are looked 




 was the other main case that directly dealt with the deductibility of share based 
payments but the case was only an Income Tax Special Court case, which makes the Labat 
case superior to it. 
        A company entered into an agreement for the purchase of part of a seller‟s business. 
Consideration to be paid for the business, as stated in the agreement, included an amount 
relating to the license agreement belonging to the seller. The licensing agreement comprised a 
licensing agreement with an Australian company and this included all intellectual property 
and know-how relating to the seller‟s business. The purchaser paid the consideration required 
by the issue of ordinary shares to the seller at a premium. The Commissioner argued that the 
taxpayer did not incur any expenditure because the issuing and allotment of shares by a 
company does not constitute expenditure incurred by a company. 
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       The court‟s judgment, as held by Goldblatt J, was based on a South African textbook, 
Silke on South African Income Tax
57
. The court held that the taxpayer had not incurred any 
expenditure according to the findings in the textbook used. The following statement is the 
statement that determined the judgment for this case: 
“It is submitted that the word „expenditure‟ is not restricted to an outlay of cash but 
includes outlays of amounts in a form other than cash. For example, if a merchant 
were required to pay for his goods by tendering land or shares in a company, the value 
of the land or shares would constitute expenditure in terms of s 11(a) and would be 
deductible. If a merchant were to buy his goods in the United States at a price fixed in 
dollars the liability so contracted would be „expenditure‟ and would have to be 
brought to account at its equivalent in South African currency. 
        An interesting point arises when a company discharges an obligation by the issue 
of its own shares. For example, a company may remunerate one of its employees for 
services rendered by the issue of its own shares. Since the company has not lost or 
parted with any assets, it is submitted that it has not expended anything, and that it is 
not entitled to claim as a deduction from income the nominal value of the shares 
issued to the employee. The position, it is submitted, would be different if the 
employee agrees to work for a salary payable in cash but subsequently decides to 
subscribe for shares and uses the remuneration owing to him to pay for the shares. In 
such a situation the company will have incurred expenditure comprising the salary 
due, notwithstanding the fact that its obligation is subsequently discharged by the 
issue of shares. But when a company is obliged to allot shares in return for services 
rendered to it, there is no laying out or expending any of its moneys or assets which, it 
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is submitted, is an essential requisite of the words „expenditure actually incurred‟ in s 
11(a). A similar problem arises when a company allots shares in return for trading 
stock." 
           Hence the court decided that the taxpayer did not satisfy the court that it had incurred 
the expenditure as required by the Act. 
This is the case that received criticism from the late David Meyerowitz
58
 in an article in The 
Taxpayer. It was truly perplexing that Goldblatt J did not use any authority in reaching his 
decision considering that the United Kingdom cases that were referred to in ITC 1801 are 
fairly old cases that were present at the time that this judgment was passed, even though 
Harms AP said that they did not assist with dealing with the meaning of „expenditure‟. 
However, from the textbook passage quoted above, we can see that the author described the 
situation that I described earlier; the situation when the taxpayer decides to eliminate the mid 
– process of getting payment from the employee and using that same payment to remunerate 
the employee. 
       We can also have a look at a foreign case that was not used by the tax court in the 
making of its decision but would have been considered as relevant since the tax court did use 
foreign authority to come to its decision. The case is an Australian case and according to Van 
Ransberg
59
, the Australian Taxation Office does not regard share – based payments as either 
an „outgoing‟ for purposes of section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1997, or 
„expenditure‟ for the purposes of section 73B (which is a section that allows for a deduction 
in respect of research and development) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 – which is 
considered to be the equivalent of the general deduction formula in the South African Income 
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Tax Act. In Van Ransberg‟s view, this is the case that actually considered the meaning of 
„expenditure‟. This facts and the judgment of the case are below: 
Lowry (Inspector of Taxes) v Consolidated African Selection Trust Limited
60
 
The taxpayer issued some shares to employees at par value. This value was considerably less 
that the market value of the shares. The taxpayer claimed the difference between the par 
value and the market value of the shares as a deduction in its calculation of its corporate 
income tax liability. 
        The court held that such difference was not deductible. In the judgment, Viscount 
Maugham said the following; “Indeed the issue of shares by a trading company is not a 
trading transaction at all. The corporate entity becomes pro tanto larger; but the receipts of 
the trade on the one hand and the amount of the costs and expenditure necessary for earning 
those receipts on the other remain unaltered, and it is the difference between those two sums 
which is taxable”. Viscount Maugham further says that the issue of shares by a company does 
not affect the profits or gains or gains of the company for the purposes of Income Tax, 
whether they are issued at par or over. Viscount Caldecote LC asked whether the issue of 
these shares in the manner adopted involved the taxpayer company in any „disbursements or 
expenditure....wholly laid out for the purposes of‟ its trade if its capital was intact after the 
issue of the shares. He concluded by saying that the taxpayer‟s trading receipts were not 
diminished, nor did he think that it was in the right view of the facts to say that the taxpayer 
company gave away money‟s worth to its own pecuniary detriment. 
         This case is different from the other share based payments cases, which might be the 
reason why it was not considered by the tax court when the tax court came to its conclusion. 
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It was a case that did not deal with share based payments per se; it dealt with the issue of 
forgoing a premium amount. However, as seen from the above, the judgment was somehow 




In 1950, the Income Tax Court of Natal had to decide if a share based payment was 
deductible. The share based payment was made or technical services in connection with the 
erection of a factory and the subsequent supervision of its production. The issue that the court 
had to decide on was whether such payment was deductible but the only question that was 
brought before the court was whether the expenditure was of a capital nature or of a revenue 
nature. 
         The court viewed that the payment was to cover the costs of the services rendered to the 
appellant company, both in respect of the erection of the factory building and from then on in 
respect of the conduct of its business. However, with regards to the payment in respect of the 
conduct of the appellant company‟s business, the court held that it was not of a capital nature 





This was another recent case that dealt with share based payments. The Pretoria Tax Court, in 
2006, had to decide whether the transfer of a taxpayer‟s own shares to a supplier of a service 
constituted payment or not. Bertelsman J followed the judgment in ITC 1801 by Jootse JA. 
The decision in ITC 1801 conflicted with the decision in ITC 1783 but Bertelsman referred to 
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the judgment in ITC 1801 as a “comprehensive and most persuasive judgment” because it 
cited the dictum of Nicholas AJA in Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR [1988] 50 SATC 81 at 95 that: 
"Actually incurred does not mean „actually paid‟, but means all expenditure actually incurred 
during the year, whether the liability has been discharged during that year or not."  The court 
in ITC 1783 had not considered precedent from the highest court in the United Kingdom, 
which had rejected the statement that the issue of shares was not the giving of a consideration 















To determine the tax liability of a taxpayer, the taxpayer should be allowed certain 
deductions and allowances from his income. Hence the main question to be asked when a 
company pays for the receipt of services by issuing its own shares is whether or not the 
company has met the requirements of section 11(a) read with section 23(g), precisely the 
phrase „expenditure actually incurred‟ for such payment to be allowed as a deduction against 
the taxpayer‟s income. This is because this issue is not dealt with in the Act; hence the 
question still arises even though the Labat case brought some light to the issue. The issue 
about shares issued as payment for services rendered is a very tricky situation to deal with 
because the only clarity in the Act is on share based payments made for the acquisition of 
assets. Even after the Labat judgment, tax professionals are still debating this issue because it 
was not. In my view, there might have been a wrong choice of words in the judgment. 
However, one has to rely on the decision of the Labat case, as flawed as it is, because it is the 
only case that deals with such a situation and because it was a SCA decision which must be 
followed by all the courts below. Taxpayers therefore need to be careful when entering into 
transactions in which they will be required to issue shares to the other party so that they do 
not get in predicaments such as the Labat case by not eliminating the mid process that is 
usually eliminated when a taxpayer makes a share based payment. In other words, taxpayers 
need to pay cash for the service rendered and have the other party pay for the shares issued to 
it using the cash received for the services rendered.  
           The argument that a taxpayer company incurs a legal unconditional obligation on 
conclusion of the contract to make a share based payment which results is considered as 












which should be taken in to consideration. Once a taxpayer has an unconditional liability, 
according to case law, that taxpayer has actually incurred expenditure because the incurrence 
of expenditure is not limited to an outlay of cash as stated by Harms AP in the Labat 
decision. The term „expenditure‟ was defined as a diminution or a movement of assets of a 
person who expends the funds, in the findings of Labat. The term „expenditure‟ is not defined 
in the Income tax Act 58 of 1962. 
          Another compelling argument is the argument that when a taxpayer agrees to make a 
share based payment; it forgoes its right to claim cash which results in the taxpayer losing out 
on an asset and subsequently meeting the requirements for „expenditure‟ as defined in the 
Labat decision. If the outcomes of the foreign case laws that agree with this argument that a 
taxpayer loses a right to receive payment when the pay for service with a share based 
payment are followed, the share based payments for services will be deductible as long as the 
taxpayer meets all the other requirements for such deduction to be allowable. This argument 
also meets the definition of „expenditure‟ as defined by Harms AP and Goldblatt J that 
„expenditure‟ entails a disbursement of assets, because when a taxpayer loses a right, an asset 
is lost since rights are considered as assets. 
           In my opinion, shares issued for payments do qualify as „expenditure actually 
incurred‟ because of the arguments that I have dealt with above. I therefore believe that the 
Labat decision was wrongly decided by the SCA In my view, to eliminate confusion and 
disappointment where the court may not allow such deductions, taxpayers should attempt not 
to skip the mid process of acquiring cash from the seller for the shares and using that money 
to pay for the services received. It may seem redundant, but it is better to be safe than be in a 















South African Sources 
Labat Africa Limited, CSARS v, 74 SATC 1 (SCA), 2011  
Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI 1986 (3) SA 549 (A), 48 SATC 55 
Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR 1988 (3) SA 876 (A), 50 SATC 81  
Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd, CIR v, 1993 (4) SA 110 (A), 55 SATC 198  
Ackermans Limited v CSARS 2011 (1) SA 1 (SCA),73 SATC 1   
ITC 1801 68 SATC 57 
Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR 1975 (1) SA 665 (A), 37 SATC 1 
ITC 1783 66 SATC 373 
Lace proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR 1938 AD 267, 9 SATC 349 
ITC 703, 17 SATC 208 
ITC 1822, 69 SATC 200 
 
Foreign Cases 
Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Limited 1942 1 A11 ER 634 (CA
 
) 
Craddock v Zevo Finance Co Limited 1944 1 A11 ER 566 (CA) 
Stanton (Inspector of Taxes) v Drayton Commercial Investments Co Limited 1982 1 A11 ER 
121 (CA) 















Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
 
Secondary Sources 
A Guide through IFRS Part A The conceptual framework and requirements 
Cilliers, Chris „The Labat decision and the interaction between “Expenditure” and the 
“Actually incurred” requirement‟ 2011 The Taxpayer Volume 60 No 12 
De Swardt, R „Do share based payments made for the procurement of services qualify as 
expenditure actually incurred‟ 2008 De Jure Volume 3, Jaargang 41 Lexis Nexis 
Emslie, Trevor SC „Expenditure Actually Incurred‟ 2011 The Taxpayer Volume 60 No 10 
and 11 
M. L. Stein and C. Divaris Silke on South African Income Tax, the Eleventh Memorial 
Edition by (1991) 
Marias, Albertus „The (In) Equity of Labat‟ 2013 The Taxpayer Volume 62 No 1 
Meyerowitz, D „Paying for goods and services by issuing shares‟ 2004 Taxpayer 86 
Van Zyl, SP „The meaning of “expenditure” for purposes of section 11(a) and (gA) of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962- CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd [2011] ZASCA 157‟ 2012 Obiter 
Van Rensburg, EC „Some thoughts on the meaning of “expenditure” in the Income Tax Act‟ 
2013 TSAR 1 
The Taxpayer 2011 Volume 60 No 9 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
